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The Cadbury Code and Recurrent Crisis
“A fascinating book, tracing the development of the UK Corporate Governance
Code and highlighting its continuity through successive crises. It identifies areas
of controversy and challenge, intriguingly suggesting that ‘defeated logics’ are
merely suspended, perhaps poised to return. Essential interdisciplinary reading
for all those interested in the UK’s corporate governance system.”
—Andrew Johnston, Professor of Company Law and Corporate Governance,
School of Law, University of Warwick
“The importance of the Cadbury Committee and the codes of corporate gover-
nance that followed in shaping the current form and scope of possibility for
corporate governance in the UK can hardly be underestimated. Nordberg’s fasci-
nating account of the process by which these have been shaped by individuals
and institutions is a welcome examination of how the code developed over time,
what it achieved, and what it left undone. Those who care about how boards of
directors work and how that work is guided by policy can learn much from this
study.”
—Dr. Jeroen Veldman, Associate Professor, Nyenrode Business
University, The Netherlands
“Professor Nordberg provides a timely and thoughtful discussion on a topic
which, if anything, is even more important than it was some three decades ago.
Recurrent corporate governance crises indeed indicate that the current paradig-
matic approach to good corporate governance, with its focus on internal control,
risk management, audit, overseen by a board, and increasingly dependent on the
contribution of the independent director, may provide limited assurance as to
its ability to prevent further cases of governance failures. Since the early 1990s
we have seen increasingly damaging examples of governance failures which must
give rise to the question whether the various corporate governance codes, guides,
laws and formal reviews address the core problem of governance, how to prevent
those entrusted with the assets of others from abusing their position, to a satisfac-
tory degree. This is not purely an academic concern. Gross failures of governance
can touch upon the livelihoods of entire nations and increasingly impact on the
global community through the concept of ecological governance which aims at
incorporating issues of biodiversity and species extinction into the heart of the
governance model. The late Sir Adrian Cadbury created an admirable and world
leading guide to best governance practice, setting in motion a process of contin-
uously reviewing, refining, and updating a Code which endured the test of time
and is adopted across many jurisdictions. Nordberg’s book strongly contributes
to the debate on how to address an age-old problem in a rapidly changing envi-
ronment. By reflecting on current insights, urging to learn from past mistakes,
emphasising a broad discussion, and most of all, keeping an open mind to poten-
tial future solutions, Nordberg continues the great tradition of asking critical
questions without necessarily providing predetermined answers.”
—Oliver Marnet is Associate Professor in Accounting at the Southampton Business
School, who has written extensively on corporate governance and external audit,
and has provided written evidence to BEIS, CMA, ICSA, ICAEW, PIRC, the
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the time of the Cadbury deliberations, I was an editorial executive for
the news agency Reuters, then based in New York. There we were preoc-
cupied by the collapse of the Soviet Union and an emerging economic
order based on triumphant capitalism. As journalists, however, we could
not escape the concern for colleagues when Robert Maxwell’s two UK-
listed corporations—Mirror Group Newspapers and Maxwell Communi-
cation—collapsed. Also, Maxwell had sat as non-executive director on the
Reuters board as it listed on the London Stock Exchange and rapidly
moved into the FTSE100 index, serving alongside his arch-rival Rupert
Murdoch.
But there was more. The demise of Maxwell’s companies was foreshad-
owed by fraudulent use of their pension funds to prop up his faltering
share prices. Those who lost their retirement savings included reporters
and editors at the New York Daily News, which Maxwell owned. For jour-
nalists, this governance failure was personal. When I returned to London
a few years later, I discovered that a strange term—‘corporate gover-
nance’—had entered the everyday discourse, not just of investors and
corporate directors, but of journalists as well.
By the time ‘Cadbury’ morphed into the ‘Combined Code’, I was
involved in shareholder relations and met Bernard Taylor at Henley
Management College, who convened an annual conference on board
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for a special issue on corporate governance co-edited by my colleague at
Bournemouth University, Steve Letza, and used here with permission.
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Prologue
Since 1992, corporate governance in the UK and much of the world has
been articulated in codes of conduct, rather than formal law and regu-
lations or even less formal social arrangements. Moreover, despite their
gradual revision over the years, their core tenets survived despite repeated
and arguably growing shocks to the system they were meant to protect.
That suggests the problems they sought to address have not been solved.
Britain—in particular its banks—was perhaps the worst hit by the global
financial crisis, at a cost to the state that continues more than a decade
later. How did various revisions fail to undertake fresh approaches to the
recurring crises?
This book explores how corporate governance in Britain came to be
codified, what key disputes took place during its major revisions, and how
it institutionalised a way of viewing what corporate governance should be.
This study also suggests that the while the flexibility that was built into the
code’s compliance regime allowed for variations, few companies took the
opportunities provided to experiment with other ways of organisation the
work of boards of directors. The code is much admired, with good reason.
And it has achieved wide legitimacy. But is it the model for corporate
governance?
The Cadbury Code and Report was the starting point for this new
direction. It combined a set of principles of good governance that served
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as a how to guide for listed companies. It established a regulatory frame-
work that guided equity capital markets and proposed ways that share-
holders—principally institutional investors—should relate to the compa-
nies in which they invest. This framework was loose because of a central
plank of the code: it was to be voluntary, subject the requirement
that companies explain why they decided not to comply. Although the
Cadbury Code did not use the phrase, this idea quickly attracted the label
‘comply-or-explain’.
Moreover, the influence of this domestic exercise was vast. The code’s
ideas were copied in countries around the world, from France to South
Africa to Germany, then to much of Africa and South America, and to
Russia and Japan. One of its core tenets even found its way into the listing
requirements of the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq, despite wide
criticism from American CEOs: the provision concerning the separation
of roles of the company chair and the chief executive officer (CEO), to
prevent one person having ‘unfettered’ boardroom control. There, too,
‘comply-or-explain’ applied.
The code’s influence grew even larger. Its principles informed other
codes, often written by professional bodies for a wide range of organi-
sation types far removed from the world of capital markets, investment
portfolios, and even shareholders.
The UK code of corporate governance is widely admired and imitated,
but it has not prevented the types of emergency that led to its creation—
recurring failures of large corporations because of the lack of oversight and
internal control. The biggest case was the financial crisis of 2007–2009,
in which the UK suffered disproportionate damage, as we shall see.
Were we expecting too much of a code of conduct? Why did the
framers of the code not recommend something stronger than a voluntary
code of conduct?
This study examines those questions through analysis of the debates
that led up to the drafting of the original Cadbury Code and then the
major revisions undertaken in 2003 and 2010 in response to renewed
crises. It does so through a critical discourse analysis of contributions
to the consultations that informed the drafting, undertaken against the
economic and political context that shaped the code and was then shaped
by it.
It shows, historically, how the process engaged actors from all parts
of the chain of investment, and how that process embedded power in the
hands of central actors. Theoretically, it shows how the logics employed in
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the debate became institutionalised, but also how the form of their insti-
tutionalisation provided opportunities for change, leaving rejected logics
suspended not defeated, so they could resurface later, which enhanced
the legitimacy of the process. Practically, it demonstrates how the code’s
flexibility forestalled more radical action and won acceptance even among
those whose views it rejected.
The crisis in corporate governance is one MacAvoy and Millstein call
‘recurrent’. ‘The turnaround began taking place in the mid-1990s … The
die was cast for effective governance through board structure and process
and we could move on … but the new form was not universally and
instantaneously followed by changes in conduct’ (2003, pp. 2–3). They
were writing just as US financial markets had just been rocked by failures
of very large corporations, the collapse of the market in new technology
companies, and the implosion of one of the five global accountancy and
audit firms. They expressed their concern that the responses, in regula-
tion and corporate behaviour would prove disappointing. There was some
change in US practice, which included translating some aspects of UK
corporate governance into US listing requirements. Yet before the decade
was out, both countries would experience an even more serious corporate
governance crisis.
This study examines how the UK reforms, enacted in the 1990s and
repeatedly revised, kept options for different responses open to debate
but nonetheless left them unexplored in practice. It questions what might
have happened if the roads not taken had been followed, perhaps as exper-
iments rather than policy, and if in practice the code had been followed
with the degrees of freedom that its language of explanation proposed.
Instead of striving for formal compliance, and thus escape enforcement
via investors and the proxy voting agencies they employed, corporate
boards might have adopted a more thoughtful approach. They might
have adapted code recommendations and innovated in board design and
process to suit the peculiar circumstances of the company, rather than
shaping the board and its processes to fit the code. What sort of ethos
might then have developed?
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